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ABSTRACT 
 
Minsky’s classification of fragility according to hedge, speculative, and Ponzi positions is 
well-known. He wrote about fragile positions of individual firms and of the economy as a 
whole, with the economy transitioning naturally from a robust financial structure 
(dominated by hedge units) to a fragile structure (dominated by speculative units). In 
most of Minsky’s writing, he introduced government through its impact on the private 
sector with its spending and balance sheet operations as stabilizing forces (although he 
insisted that stability is ultimately destabilizing). On a few occasions he also analyzed the 
government’s own balance sheet position. More rarely, Minsky extended his analysis to 
the open economy, examining the fragility of external debt positions. In these works, he 
analyzed the United States as the “world’s bank” and discussed the impact of various 
U.S. balance sheet positions on the rest of the world. This paper will carefully examine 
Minsky’s position on these topics, and will offer an extension of Minsky’s work. It will 
also examine the “sustainability” of the current “twin U.S. deficits.” 
 
JEL Classifications: E32, E42, E62, F4, G15 
 
Keywords: Hyman Minsky, financial fragility, financial instability hypothesis, current 
account deficit, budget deficit   3
Minsky’s best-known contribution is his tripartite classification of balance sheets: hedge, 
speculative, and Ponzi. A hedge position is one in which the cash flows arising from the 
liability structure can be fully met out of the prospective income flows from assets; both 
interest and principal payments can be met as they come due. A speculative position is 
one which can meet interest payments, but principal will have to be rolled-over until 
some date in the future, at which time income flows are expected to rise. Finally, a Ponzi 
unit cannot even make interest payments out of current and near-term income flows, so 
they are capitalized as outstanding debt grows. A Ponzi position can be fraudulent (there 
is no likely scenario in which all commitments can be fulfilled—as in a pyramid scheme), 
but more likely results from unanticipated events (rates on floating interest liabilities rise, 
or expected cash flows are not forthcoming—either situation can push a speculative unit 
to Ponzi). This classification scheme plays a major role in Minsky’s theory of the 
endogenous transformation of the financial structure of the economy to fragility, subject 
to rising risk of financial crises. 
 
Most of Minsky’s analysis in this area focuses on the evolution of the domestic 
private sector of the economy, and most specifically on the rising fragility of the for-
profit business sector. The government is introduced as a stabilizing sector, whose budget 
position moves counter cyclically toward deficits to prop up income—and most 
importantly, business profits—in a downturn. Further, Minsky has analyzed the related 
private portfolio effects of “Big Government” budget movements. A budget deficit means 
that private sector portfolios will accumulate safe assets in a downturn. He is also justly 
famous for his analysis of the operation of the “Big Bank” (central bank) that intervenes 
as a lender of last resort, helping to put a floor on asset prices. In addition, he proposed 
various packages of policies that could be adopted, both by the central bank and by fiscal 
authorities, to help stabilize the private sector of the economy. 
 
All of this is well-known. What is less appreciated is Minsky’s treatment of 
possible fragility of the government sector, itself, and of national fragility. In fact, 
Minsky had long been concerned with the dollar’s fortunes and implications for the U.S. 
of the break-down of Bretton Woods. He became increasingly worried about the debt   4
positions of developing nations during the experiment with Reaganomics. The impacts of 
Supply Side economics on the U.S. federal budget were also of great concern to him. 
There have been some attempts by Minsky and by others after him to extend his 
classification of the private sector financial structure to governments and economies as a 
whole. This paper will explore the extent to which such an extension can be carried. 
Obviously, this exploration is not of mere academic interest, with the U.S. simultaneously 
running record (for it) balance of payments deficits and fairly large and rising budget 
deficits. 
 
MINSKY’S VIEWS ON THE FISCAL BALANCE 
 
Minsky realized early on that there is no default risk on national government debt issued 
in the sovereign’s currency, nor any necessary problem with running “chronic” fiscal 
deficits. (Adelman and Minsky [1960?]); this is not surprising given that he was a close 
colleague of Abba Lerner) Further, he also recognized that only national government debt 
represents net financial wealth to the private sector (in a closed economy), and that a 
higher percent of national government debt in private portfolios makes private balance 
sheets safer. This, he argued, would normally stimulate private spending. Finally, even as 
early as 1960 he rigorously demonstrated that in a growing economy with a constant 
capital-output ratio and in which the private sector desires to hold some safe, liquid 
assets, a budget deficit is required to maintain full employment. (Adelman and Minsky 
1960*) Indeed, he demonstrated that the national debt must grow at the same rate as 
private wealth (and productive capacity), meaning that the deficit must grow over time. 
The optimal level of the national debt (and growth of it) would thus depend on portfolio 
preferences of the public. If preferences for safe assets were to fall as the economy 
grows, then the optimal size (and growth) of the deficit would decrease. He concluded 
that the best combination of fiscal and monetary policy is a secular deficit with a low 
interest rate. (Adelman and Minsky [1960?])  
 
He later continued in a similar vein in 1963 when he argued that an expansion led 
by growth of government spending would generate less fragility than one led by private 
spending. (Minsky 1963) This is because he recognized the interrelations among the three   5
sectors (government, domestic private, and foreign—very similar to the approach taken 
by Wynne Godley) so that a private sector led expansion will worsen private balance 
sheets while moving foreign and government balances toward surpluses (more on these 
relations below). Later Minsky added the famous Kalecki profits equation to his 
arsenal—explicitly recognizing that budget deficits add to profit flows. As he emphasized 
in his 1986 book, “big government” has three effects: the Keynesian “multiplier”, the 
portfolio effects he had discussed in the early 1960s, and the profit income (Kaleckian) 
effects. (Minsky 1986c) Together these allow for powerful countercyclical impacts so 
long as the government is big and its budget is designed to move in a countercyclical 
manner. 
 
After the Reagan tax cuts and increased defense spending, Minsky began to worry 
that the budget had become too slack, biased toward large deficits even as the economy 
neared full employment. He still argued for a big government: “A government whose 
spending is at least 16 percent and perhaps as high as 20 percent of prosperity GNP is 
necessary to protect the economy against a catastrophic decline in investment and 
profits.” (Minsky 1986c) While the Reagan-era tax system “was not out of line”, the 
“expenditure system was too big by almost $100 billion for a balanced budget if an 
approximation to full employment could be achieved.” (Minsky 1986c) He still 
recognized that occasional and even chronic budget deficits could be acceptable, but he 
insisted that even government must have a budget that could generate “a positive cash 
flow in circumstances that it is reasonable to expect will occur…A government can run a 
deficit without suffering a deterioration of its creditworthiness if there is a tax and 
spending regime in place that would yield a favorable cash flow (a surplus) under 
reasonable and attainable circumstances.” (Minsky 1986c) For federal government debt 
to retain value, it—like any other debtor—“has to be able to generate a positive cash flow 
in its favor.” (Minsky 1986c) Regarding the implication of the Reagan deficits, he 
concluded “there will either be a run from the dollar or a substantial debt repudiation 
through inflation. Either way, interest rates will rise to new highs as markets react and as 
the Federal Reserve either moves to protect the dollar or stop inflation.” (Minsky 1986c)  
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Arguably, these events did not come to pass. There was no run from the dollar 
and no run-up of inflation. However, what is perhaps more important is that these 1986 
statements by Minsky are not easy to square with his early 1960s beliefs. What is even 
more surprising is that between the 1960s and the 1980s, the U.S. had abandoned gold 
and the Bretton Woods system. If anything—and for reasons to be explored—the 
movement to a floating exchange rate (even if it is “dirty”) should have relaxed, not 
tightened, fiscal restraints. As mentioned above, Minsky was aware of Abba Lerner’s 
“functional finance” approach to deficits. He was also familiar with Knapp’s “state 
money” approach at least by the early 1980s (when he presented the ideas in his classes); 
his 1986 book included the statement that “the fact that taxes need to be paid gives value 
to the money of the economy.” (Minsky 1986c p. 231; Wray 1990, 1998, 2004) These 
1986 statements appear to ensorse a much more traditional “sound finance” approach to 
government budgets—or, at least, what Eisner called a “deficit dove” position: cyclical 
deficits are acceptable, but persistent and secularly growing deficits are not. So the 
question is, did Minsky go wrong in his analysis of the Reagan budgets, and if so, where? 
 
FINANCING GOVERNMENT SPENDING (IN A FLOATING RATE REGIME)  
 
In the typical presentation, government faces a budget constraint according to which its 
spending must be “financed” by taxes, borrowing (bond sales), or “money creation.” 
Since many countries prohibit direct “money creation” by the government’s treasury, it is 
argued that “printing money” is possible only through complicity of the central bank—
which could buy the government’s bonds while issuing bank reserves—effectively 
“printing money.” (Lavoie 2003) Such a practice is nearly universally derided as bad 
policy that would almost certainly cause inflation, and, in fact, is illegal in some nations. 
 
In reality, the government that issues the floating currency spends by issuing 
checks or by directly crediting bank accounts. Tax payments lead to debits of bank 
accounts. Deficit spending by government results in net credits to bank accounts. 
Usually, those receiving payments from government hold banking system liabilities while 
their banks hold reserves in the form of central bank liabilities. (We can ignore leakages 
from deposits—and reserves—into cash held by the non-bank public. These are always   7
accommodated by the central bank—which provides reserves (“horizontally”) to banks to 
meet the cash drain.) In short, government deficit spending takes the form of net credits 
to banks, which increases their reserves. (Wray 1998) 
 
In the real world, things are a bit more complicated because it is common to 
separate treasury and central bank operations. In the U.S., the treasury writes checks on 
its central bank account, while reserves are credited to banks by the central bank. There 
are thus complex coordinating procedures adopted by the central bank and treasury. It is 
not necessary to pursue all of this accounting in more detail as it has already been 
examined in detail in Wray (1998), Bell (2000), and Bell and Wray (2002-3) for the case 
of the U.S.—and other countries adopt their own idiosyncratic procedures. The only logic 
that is necessary to grasp is that the government “spends” by emitting its own liability 
(mostly taking the form of a credit to banking system reserves), while a tax payment has 
the opposite effect: the government “taxes” by reducing its own liability (mostly taking 
the form of a debit to banking system reserves). All of this works only because the state 
has first exerted its sovereignty by imposing a tax liability on the private sector—which, 
ultimately, is the reason that the non-government sector will accept government liabilities 
as payment for the goods and services government buys.  
  
As discussed, a government deficit means that some of the reserves created by 
spending are not drained by taxes. In systems like that of the U.S., in which reserves do 
not earn interest, profit seeking behavior of banks will lead to attempts to minimize net 
reserve holdings. When an individual bank holds more reserves than desired, it lends the 
excess in interbank markets—the fed funds market in the U.S. For this reason, aggregate 
excess reserves above what is legally required or desired will cause overnight rates to 
fall, while insufficient reserves cause overnight rates to rise—in either case, automatic 
(horizontal) central bank action is taken to offset this so that the central bank can hit its 
overnight rate. However, the central bank’s ability to drain excess reserves is limited 
because it will run out of treasury debt to sell. Informal procedural rules can limit central 
bank purchases, although because the central bank buys assets by crediting banks with 
reserves, there is no theoretical limit to its ability to do this. In any case, there is a   8
division of responsibilities such that the central bank is responsible for draining/adding 
reserves on a day-to-day basis, while the treasury drains/adds reserves over a longer run. 
It does this by selling/retiring sovereign debt.  
 
Whenever it runs a sustained deficit, the treasury will be adding reserves to the 
system, which can generate excess reserves. Banks prefer interest-earning treasury debt 
over non-interest earning excess (undesired and/or nonrequired) reserves, hence there is 
no problem selling the treasury debt when deficits create excess reserves. Note, also, that 
if banks did not prefer to buy government bonds, the treasury (and central bank) would 
simply avoid selling them, and, indeed, would not need to sell the debt as the banks 
preferred to hold non-interest earning reserves. In other words, rather than deficits 
requiring the treasury to “borrow”, logically, government deficits only require the central 
bank and treasury to drain excess reserves to avoid downward pressure on overnight 
interest rates. This means that the wide-spread fear that “markets” might decide not to 
buy treasury debt if budget deficits are deemed to be too large is erroneous: bonds are not 
sold to “borrow” but rather to drain excess reserves. If “markets” prefer excess reserves, 
then bonds need not be sold—and won’t be because there will be no pressure on the 
overnight rate to be relieved. 
 
Bond sales (or purchases) by the treasury and central bank are triggered by 
deviation of reserves from the position desired (or required) by the banking system, 
which causes the overnight rate to move away from target (if the target is above zero). 
Bond sales by either the central bank or the treasury are properly seen as part of monetary 
policy designed to allow the central bank to hit its target. This target is exogenously 
“administered” by the central bank (“horizontally” maintained by ensuring banks have 
the desired quantity of reserves). Obviously, the central bank sets its target as a result of 
its belief about the impact of this rate on a range of economic variables that are included 
in its policy objectives. In other words, setting of this rate “exogenously” does not imply 
that the central bank is oblivious to economic and political constraints it perceives.  
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In this discussion we have assumed that the nation is on a flexible exchange rate 
system. Of course, Minsky’s earlier writings were completed during the fixed exchange 
rate Bretton Woods era. Such a system necessarily constrains both fiscal and monetary 
policy. The central bank’s target interest rate will be set with a view to stabilizing the 
exchange rate. This removes a “degree of freedom” because economic outcomes that 
might pressure the exchange rate can cause the central bank to change its target rate. For 
example, if it is believed that a budget deficit can raise demand and increase a trade 
deficit or cause inflation—either of which might negatively impact the foreign exchange 
value of the currency—the central bank might react by raising the target interest rate to 
increase rest of world (ROW) demand for the currency. Fiscal policy is also constrained 
by perceived pressures on exchange rates. To be sure, even nations on floating exchange 
rates formulate monetary and fiscal policy with some consideration given to possible 
impacts on exchange rates. However, with fixed exchange rate systems, there is very little 
room to maneuver: foreign currency and gold reserves are ultimately the only convincing 
weapons in the policy arsenal to maintain convertibility at a fixed exchange rate. To the 
extent that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy would threaten international reserves, 
they must be foregone. What we might call sovereign power is severely reduced. It is no 
coincidence that countries operating with fixed exchange rates today strive for policy 
austerity—and that they are quickly punished when they adopt overly expansionary 
policy. The principles discussed above do not really apply to government finance in a 
nation on a fixed exchange rate. Effectively, government liabilities are “backed by” 
foreign currency and gold reserves as there is a promise to convert domestic currency at a 
fixed exchange rate. Adoption of flexible exchange rates increases independence of 
domestic policy. 
 
In conclusion, the notion of a “government budget constraint” only applies ex 
post, as a statement of an identity rather than as an economic constraint in today’s 
floating rate system (except for those nations that adopt fixed exchange rates). Ex post, 
any increase of government spending is matched by an increase of taxes, high powered 
money (reserves and cash), and/or sovereign debt held. But this does not mean that taxes 
or bonds actually “finance” or “constrain” the government spending. Government can   10
enact provisions that dictate relations between spending and tax revenues (a legislated 
balanced budget, for example); it can require that bonds are issued before deficit 
spending takes place; it can require that the treasury have deposits at the central bank 
before it issue checks; and so on. These provisions can constrain government’s ability to 
spend at the desired level. However, such constraints are self-imposed—that is, 
discretionary, not economically necessary—although they may well be politically 
necessary.  
 
While Minsky did not explicitly detail all of this, he certainly understood and 
emphasized balance sheet accounting, and had endorsed Lerner’s functional finance 
approach that underlies the exposition above. Even in the early 1960s he had argued that 
there is no default risk on sovereign debt. If anything, that claim was made stronger by 
abandonment of Bretton Woods (as, previously, there was at least an implicit promise of 
convertibility at a fixed exchange rate—which would be broken if the currency were 
devalued). Still, by 1986 he was analyzing government as if it were a private agent that 
had to maintain the expectation that it could run surpluses. Where did Minsky go wrong?  
 
A sovereign government does not need tax revenue in the same sense in which 
private economic units need income. This is because the government can impose a tax 
liability, which generates a demand for “that which is necessary to pay taxes”—the 
government’s liability. It is certainly true that government needs taxes—because that is 
what creates the demand for HPM (high-powered money) in the first place. And if HPM 
is “too easy” to obtain, it can lose its value because no one needs to “work hard” to obtain 
it. It is not the prospect that government will be able to run a surplus under not 
implausible circumstances that gives money value, but rather the fact that the private 
sector must “work hard” to obtain it. If money “grew on trees”, its value would be 
determined by the effort required to harvest it. Minsky did argue somewhat along these 
grounds asserting that providing welfare tends to be inflationary, while providing jobs is 
not. 
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This might not be too much more than a quibble over imprecise language. Minsky 
emphasized that a robust economy should generate a budget surplus, and it is the 
expectation that government can run a surplus that allows money to retain value. A robust 
economy would result from falling desire of the private sector to accumulate net saving in 
the form of government liabilities (HPM plus bonds)—so that it is spending more than its 
income (see below). If the budget did not move to surplus, allowing liabilities to reflux to 
government (for “retirement”), the supply would be too great to be consistent with stable 
value. Hence, the “automatic stabilizer” feature of the federal budget helps to ensure that 
the budget deficit is at the right level to supply the right amount of government liabilities 
consistent with the private sector’s desire to net accumulate them. If Minsky had simply 
stated that the Reagan budget did not have sufficient automatic stabilization on the 
upswing to attenuate a boom, he would have been on strong theoretical grounds—even if 
empirically it appears that he was mistaken. (The Reagan deficits did decline with 
expansion, and the Clinton boom generated a uniquely large budget surplus—indicating 
that there was a strong counter-cyclical bias built into the budget.) 
 
THE CURRENT FISCAL BALANCE 
 
Following Godley, we can think of the economy as being composed of 3 sectors: a 
domestic private sector, a government sector, and a foreign sector. (Godley 2005) If one 
of these spends more than its income, at least one of the others must spend less than its 
income because for the economy as a whole, total spending must equal total receipts or 
income. So while there is no reason why any one sector has to run a balanced budget, the 
system as a whole must. In practice, the private sector traditionally runs a surplus—
spending less than its income. This is how it accumulates net financial wealth. For the 
U.S. this has averaged about 2-3% of GDP, but it does vary considerably over the cycle. 
(See Figure 1.) Private sector saving (or surplus) is a leakage that must be matched by an 
injection. Before Reagan the U.S. essentially had a balanced foreign sector; the current 
account swung between small deficits and surpluses. After Reagan, the U.S. ran growing 
trade deficits, so that today the current account runs nearly 6% of GDP. That is another 
leakage that will be explored in more detail below.  
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In the U.S., the government sector taken as a whole almost always runs a budget 
deficit, reaching to around 5% under Reagan and both Bushes. For the U.S., that is the 
injection that offsets the “normal” private and foreign sector leakages. With a traditional 
private sector surpl. .of 2-3% and a more or less balanced trade account, the “normal” 
budget deficit needed to be about 2-3% during the early Reagan years. This would be 
consistent with Minsky’s early 1960s insights that government ought to run a growing 
budget deficit. Until the Clinton expansion, the private sector never ran a deficit. 
However, since 1996 the private sector has been in deficit every year except one (during 
the depths of the recession), and that deficit climbed to more than 5% of GDP at the peak 
of the boom. This actually drove the federal budget into surplus as high as 2.5% of GDP. 
With the trade deficit at about 4% of GDP, the private sector deficit was the sum of the 
overall budget surplus and the current account deficit. While almost all economists and 
policy makers thought the Clinton budget surplus was a great achievement (and projected 
the surplus to continue for 15 years or more), they never realized that by identity it meant 
that the private sector had to spend more than its income on a hitherto unknown scale, so 
that rather than accumulating financial wealth it was running up debt. The surplus was 
short-lived, as it drove the economy into recession. 
 
As mentioned, the trade deficit represents a leakage of demand from the U.S. 
economy to foreign production. There is nothing necessarily bad about this, so long as we 
have another source of demand for U.S. output, such as a federal budget that is biased to 
run an equal and offsetting deficit. Private sector net saving (that is, running a surplus) is 
also a leakage. As discussed above, that was typically 2-3% in the past. If we add in the 
current account deficit that we have today (about 6% of GDP), that gives us a total 
“normal” leakage out of aggregate demand of 8 or 9% of GDP.  
 
This leakage would have to be made up by an injection from the third sector, the 
government—the only way to sustain such a large leakage is for the overall government 
to run a deficit of that size. Since state and local governments are required by 
constitutions and markets to balance their budgets, and on average actually run surpluses, 
it is up to the federal government to run deficits. The federal budget deficit is largely non-  13
discretionary over a business cycle, and at least over the shorter run we can take the trade 
balance as also outside the scope of policy.  
 
A driving force of the cycle, then, is the private sector leakages (however, this is 
not to be interpreted incorrectly as an endorsement of the view that leakages “cause” or 
“finance” injections—which has got it backwards). When the private sector has a strong 
desire to save, it tries to reduce its spending below its income. Domestic firms cut 
production, and imports might fall too. The economy cycles downward into a recession 
as demand falls and unemployment rises. Tax revenues fall and some kinds of social 
spending (such as unemployment compensation) rise. The budget deficit increases more-
or-less automatically. This is what happened in 2000 when the private sector went to 
surplus and the budget turned around to deficit. Incredibly, the private sector’s surplus 
was short-lived as it quickly resumed its deficit spending. Unlike the 1990s, however, 
only the household sector is now driving the private sector’s deficit—the business sector 
has maintained a surplus since 2000. It now appears the private sector might be cooling 
off, and the Bush budget deficits are starting to rise again. Of course, we cannot predict 
when the private sector will finally return to a more “normal” surplus, nor can we predict 
how much the current account deficit will be affected by a slowdown. It is probable that 
the trade deficit will fall by several percent of GDP if America goes into a recession, 
which will reduce the necessary fiscal deficit commensurately. Still, it is not at all 
impossible that the budget deficit will rise above 6% of GDP if the private sector moves 
into surplus.  
 
The U.S. experienced something highly unusual during the Clinton expansion and 
since because the private sector has been willing to spend far more than its income; the 
normal private sector leakages turned into very large and persistent injections. The 
economy grew quickly and tax revenues literally exploded. State governments and the 
federal government experienced record surpluses. These surpluses represented a leakage 
that brought the expansion to a relatively sudden halt. Bush’s tax cuts plus spending on 
the “war” against terrorism have reduced and perhaps removed the Clinton-era bias 
toward surpluses at moderate rates of growth. However, the budget still seems to be   14
sufficiently tight—given the large trade deficits—that the “normal” private sector balance 
now must be a large deficit in order for the economy to grow robustly.  
 
Rather than the government sector being the main source of injections that allow 
the leakages that represent private sector savings, we now have the private sector 
dissaving in order to allow the foreign leakages. This sets up a highly unstable situation 
because private debt ratios rise quickly and a greater percentage of income goes to 
service those debts. While Fed policy normally doesn’t matter much, in a highly indebted 
economy, rising interest rates can increase debt problems very quickly—setting off 
bankruptcies that can snowball into a 1930s-style debt deflation. The current situation 
seems to drive home Minsky’s 1960s view that the budget must normally be in deficit, 
and that the deficit must rise in absolute terms over time. A balanced budget or surplus 
will be achieved only in run-away expansions, unless the U.S. trade account takes an 
unexpected and very large turn in favor of U.S. exports. Later we will return to the 
sustainability of the current private sector stance, and by implication to the sustainability 
of the fiscal and foreign sector stances. First, let us turn to Minsky’s views on the external 
balance.  
  
MINSKY’S VIEWS ON THE EXTERNAL BALANCE 
 
Since the Reagan years, the U.S. trade deficit has grown steadily to a record 6+% of 
GDP. As discussed, this has negative consequences for U.S. aggregate demand, and also 
for domestic profits as demonstrated in the Kalecki equation. In the current situation, the 
external (current account) deficit of about 6% of GDP equals the sum of the private 
sector deficit of 2% of GDP and the government budget deficit of 4% of GDP. (See 
Figure 2.) Here we look at the implication of a continuing and growing trade deficit for 
national income flows and external indebtedness to assess possible national fragility. The 
question is whether it makes sense to apply Minsky’s classifications to the U.S. as a 
whole: is the U.S. a speculative or Ponzi finance unit? 
 
In several pieces, Minsky used the “four tiers” perspective on balance of 
payments. (Minsky 1979, 1986a) The four tiers are: “(1) current imports and exports of   15
goods and services, including remittances and other invisibles; (2) receipts and 
expenditures due to income from capital assets owned abroad; (3) long-term private 
investments; and (4) short-term debts or the movements of international reserves (gold) 
among countries.” (Minsky 1979 p. 111; see also 1986a p. 9) There is also a fifth tier 
(military expenditures and government investment abroad), although of lesser 
importance. In the 1960s the U.S. had an overall balance of payments deficit, but the first 
two tiers were positive. U.S. private investments abroad (tier 3) offset the surplus on the 
first two tiers, allowing the ROW to accumulate small net positions in short-term dollar 
assets. This, according to Minsky, was consistent with the dollar serving as the 
international reserve currency. While the dollar was kept “scarce”, the small balance of 
payments deficits ensured a steady supply of dollars needed by the ROW for use as 
international reserves. However, after 1971, tier 1 turned increasingly negative, and by 
1977 it exceeded the tier 2 surplus by a significant amount. Minsky (1979) argued that so 
many short-term dollar assets were being accumulated by the rest of the world that the 
dollar’s status as the international reserve currency was threatened. He argued that for the 
dollar to retain this position, the tier 1 deficit would have to be reduced so that it would 
be near the tier 2 surplus. In that case, U.S. foreign investment—representing net 
accumulation of long-term assets—would be approximately equal to accumulation of 
ROW holdings of short-term dollar assets.  
 
Minsky (1979) doubted that depreciation of the dollar could achieve such a 
balance, for several reasons. First, he insisted that in international trade, price is a device 
for determining where profits will be realized. In other words, given that production of 
internationally traded goods and services can and does take place through a number of 
stages that can be allocated among a number of locations, what is recorded as imports and 
exports largely consists of movement of products and services within multinationals. The 
pricing of these activities is undertaken at least partially on consideration of the most 
favorable geographic location and stage of production to record profits. Changing the 
value of a currency would not alter that decision in a predictable way. Second, 
depreciation could shake confidence in the dollar, and generate inflation in the U.S. that   16
would further erode confidence. This could generate a run on the dollar that could lead to 
financial crises, a crash, and a world-wide recession.  
 
Finally, Minsky argued that smooth adjustment of trade imbalances to currency 
depreciation would work only in a world in which finance does not matter. In the real 
world, depreciation of the international reserve currency would have far-reaching 
financial impacts. For example, dollar depreciation would reduce home currency values 
of exports of other nations, even as it favored U.S. exports. The effect on debtor ability to 
meet financial commitments could have multifarious and unpredictable impacts. The 
international financial system needs a strong “banker”, and if the U.S. is to fulfill that 
role, the dollar’s value must be maintained.  
 
This emphasis on the rest of the world’s necessity of meeting dollar-denominated 
liabilities was stressed in the aftermath of the LDC (less-developed country) debt crisis 
set off by Reaganomics and its high interest rate policies. Minsky (1986a) discussed the 
vast international network of dollar denominated debt that committed developing nations 
to large cash payments to U.S. and non-U.S. creditors. He analyzed the U.S. as a bank, 
and the ROW as depositors and borrowers. Typically the wealthier nations in the ROW 
(and OPEC nations) were the depositors, while the poorer developing nations were 
debtors. The dollar had to be made available on a large scale so that debtor nations could 
service debts. This constrains U.S. policy because high interest rates (that might be used 
to temper excessive U.S. demand) would reduce ability of debtor nations to service their 
debt. Alternatively, overly expansionary U.S. policy might lead to undesirable exchange 
rate effects. Further, Fed policy is constrained because the Fed has become responsible 
for lender of last resort intervention to the whole international financial system. Its role as 
banker to the world places limits on independence of domestic policy. 
 
The explosion of third world dollar debt after the run-up of oil prices in 1979 had 
led to the creation of huge interest and principle payment flows denominated in dollars. 
These nations had to earn dollars from tier 1 to service tier 2 payments—if not they could 
quickly become Ponzi finance units. Any significant exchange rate movements would   17
have large impacts on the world’s financial system. Further, Minsky now recognized the 
overriding importance of U.S. trade deficits in generating the dollars needed by the ROW 
to service their debts. At the same time, he saw the impacts on U.S. employment 
(especially in manufacturing), that would generate pressure for protectionist policy. That, 
however, would only generate worldwide financial crisis. (1986a) 
 
Of course, the U.S. trade deficit did continue to grow over the course of the 
1980s. Minsky proposed several alternatives to dollar depreciation to rectify imbalances. 
Among the more conventional policies he advocated were tariffs on imports, excise taxes, 
and direct controls. His most unconventional proposal was that the U.S. treasury should 
issue long term bonds denominated in foreign currency to reduce the supply of short-term 
dollar debt. He claimed this would reduce the threat of a run on the dollar. (Minsky 1979; 
[1978?]; see critique below)  Because of the impact of a trade deficit on aggregate 
demand, employment, and aggregate profits, Minsky also argued for a chronic budget 
deficit. At the same time, he called on other “rich nations” to grow, abandoning modern 
mercantilist policy that relies on trade-led growth. Importantly, Minsky argued that a 
“cross of debt” had replaced William Jennings Bryan’s “cross of gold” as the major 
impediment to world-wide economic growth. The problem was that if the U.S. were the 
only engine of growth, this might have undesirable consequences for the dollar, and thus 
for the international financial system.  
 
It was at this time that Minsky applied his hedge, speculative, and Ponzi 
classification to countries. Countries with dollar-denominated debt need to run a surplus 
on their balance of trade (termed tier 1 above) sufficient to service their payments on 
outstanding financial liabilities (tier 2). This would allow them to roll-over liabilities, 
maintaining a speculative position. If these tier 1 earnings were insufficient, then the 
country would be in a Ponzi situation. Creditor nations, however, were obliged to run 
balance of trade deficits, supplying the dollars needed by debtor nations. With the U.S. 
operating as the world’s banker, it would have to run a continuous tier 1, trade, deficit. 
Still, the U.S. would have to force a cash flow to itself, through one of the other tiers. A 
ROW preference for dollar deposits and other short term assets (tier 4) would keep the   18
dollar strong, but this could require high interest rates and believable anti-inflation policy. 
Net investment in the U.S. (tier 3) could also force a dollar reflux. Finally, net flows on 
tier 2 (net income receipts from U.S. holdings of foreign assets) could also keep the 
dollar strong in the face of a U.S. trade deficit. In the next section we examine the US’s 
current position to determine whether the classifications can be applied to the nation. 
 
THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT TODAY 
 
Of course, today’s U.S. trade deficit is much larger relative to GDP than it was when 
Minsky was writing. Further, the US has since become the world’s biggest debtor nation. 
At the end of 2004, the US net foreign asset position stood at negative $2.5 trillion (assets 
were about $10 trillion while liabilities totaled about $12.5 trillion). (Gourinchas and Rey 
2005) Almost all the liabilities were denominated in dollars, but some 70% of assets were 
denominated in foreign currencies. In 1952 the U.S. had been a large net creditor nation, 
with net assets equal to about 15% of GDP; that was slowly eroded over the years and 
finally turned negative around 1988, after which the negative net position grew rapidly to 
about 26% of GDP by the end of 2004.  
 
However, in spite of the large and growing negative asset position, the U.S. still 
enjoys a positive net income flow on assets (Minsky’s tier 2). This is because the total 
average rate of return on assets held by the U.S. exceeds the total average rate of returns 
paid by the U.S. on its liabilities by about 332 basis points. (Gourinchas and Rey 2005) 
This excess return was decomposed by Gourinchas and Rey into a return effect (higher 
returns for assets of the same risk class) and composition effect (higher returns due to 
riskier asset classes). They attribute 245 basis points of the excess return to the return 
effect; while there are composition effects they are much less important. What this means 
is that for similar risk classes, the U.S. pays a far lower return than it receives on foreign 
assets. 
 
Interestingly, the excess return has increased sharply since the break-down of 
Bretton Woods, supporting the argument that the rest of the world views U.S. dollar 
assets as safer than domestic assets of the same risk class (and perhaps indicating that   19
relative safety increased once the U.S. abandoned Bretton Woods and gold). This is also 
borne out by the finding that larger excess returns exist for relatively liquid equity and 
debt, but almost no excess return was found for direct foreign investment. (Gourinchas 
and Rey 2005) Finally, Gourinchas and Rey provide an estimate of the “tipping point” at 
which U.S. net indebtedness will lead to negative net income flows, given the 332 excess 
basis point return: when U.S. external liabilities reach 1.43 times external assets held (the 
ratio currently stands at 1.34). However, the tipping point will depend on the movements 
of the excess rate of return—if it were to rise, net liabilities could continue to rise without 
reversing net income flow.  
 
Note also that exchange rate movements have a very large impact on the dollar 
valuation of U.S. assets (depreciation of the dollar raises foreign asset values) but almost 
no effect on U.S. liabilities (since almost all are denominated in dollars). Hence the ratio 
of liabilities to assets can change significantly with the value of the dollar. Gourinchas 
and Rey calculate that a ten percent devaluation of the dollar generates a net capital gain 
to the U.S. equal to 5.9% of US GDP. Thus, rising excess returns plus depreciation of the 
dollar can allow the U.S. to maintain positive net income flows even in the face of 
growing net international indebtedness. However, the authors characterize the current 
international position of the U.S. as “venture capitalist”, with short-term liquid liabilities 
and long-term riskier assets, in contrast to its position in the 1960s when it was 
characterized by Minsky, Kindleberger and others as “the world’s banker” because of its 
maturity mismatch (short-term liabilities and longer-term assets). Further, there is a 
currency mismatch with today’s floating rates, since U.S. debts are in dollars but the 
majority of external assets are in other currencies. Finally, while the U.S. currently enjoys 
positive net income in spite of its net indebtedness, this could turn around—indeed, some 
might argue that it inevitably will. 
 
All of this seems to indicate that the U.S. is in an increasingly precarious 
situation. The question is whether the U.S. nation can be called a speculative or Ponzi 
unit, on Minsky’s definitions. Recall from above that Minsky had used these terms to 
identify highly indebted developing nations. However, these are users of the dollar: their   20
external debts are mostly in dollars, and their governments (treasury and central bank) 
cannot issue the dollar. While their banks can offer dollar deposits and make loans 
denominated in dollars, they do not have direct access to the Fed. Further, questions of 
debt problems or potential insolvency can cause a run on their currency, which 
depreciates relative to the dollar. This can cause domestic inflation and increase the dollar 
debt service burden. As the issuer of the dollar, the U.S. is in a quite different position. 
Before we examine the bigger question of the application of the classifications to the 
U.S., let us first examine how the U.S. becomes indebted, distinguishing between 
external government debt and external private debt. 
 
As discussed, the U.S. federal government incurs a deficit when its spending 
exceeds tax revenue. To summarize the argument above, modern governments with 
floating exchange rates and sovereign currencies spend by cutting checks (or directly 
crediting bank accounts); this leads to a reserve credit to the banking system. A federal 
government tax receipt leads to a reserve debit, so when expenditures exceed taxes over 
any period (say, a year), this results in net credits. If this results in excess reserves for the 
banking system, government debt is sold (by the Treasury in the new issues market, 
and/or by the Fed in the overnight market) to drain the excess. If it did not drain excess 
reserves, the overnight interest rate would be driven below the Fed’s target rate. The 
implication of this is two-fold. First, sovereign government can always service its debt by 
crediting bank accounts (which is the way it accomplishes any kind of spending). Second, 
government issues debt to drain excess reserves, not to “borrow” in the usual sense of the 
term. And, the purpose of this is to hit the interest rate target set by monetary policy. If 
the debt were not sold, banks would hold excess reserves and the overnight interest rate 
would be driven toward zero (or toward the support rate in countries that pay interest on 
reserves). It does not matter where the ultimate holder of U.S. government debt resides—
sale of bonds drains banking system reserves, and the purpose is to hit the monetary 
policy rate target. 
 
Some economists worry about what would happen if the government tried to sell 
bonds (“borrow” in their terminology) but there were no foreign demand for them (no   21
foreigners wanted to “lend” in their terminology). The answer is that if government bonds 
are offered but find no buyers, then the banking system must not hold excess reserves—
thus, there is no reason to sell bonds. This does not mean that a government deficit can 
never be too big—inflationary—but it does mean that deficits do not imply a necessity to 
“borrow.” U.S. budget deficits allow the nongovernment sector (including foreigners) to 
accumulate claims on the U.S. government. These claims will be in some combination of 
high powered money (reserves and cash--HPM) and interest-earning bills and bonds, 
determined in a fairly straightforward manner by private preferences for HPM versus 
bills and bonds, plus government commitment to maintaining positive overnight interest 
rates (as well as possibly trying to influence the term structure of interest rates). There is 
no reason to fear that Chinese will stop “lending” to the US treasury—if China did not 
buy bonds, then HPM would be accumulated. 
 
Let us turn to private sector external debt. When a U.S. non-sovereign consumer 
purchases an imported Toyota, she either gives up income or sells an asset or issues a 
liability to finance the purchase. The Japanese exporter holds a dollar claim on a US bank 
that probably will be converted to a yen claim on a Japanese bank, which in turn will 
convert a dollar reserve to a yen reserve at the Bank of Japan (although total yen reserves 
at the Bank of Japan (BOJ) will rise only if required/desired reserves rise—otherwise, the 
BOJ “sterilizes” or “accommodates” by an offsetting action). Alternatively, the Japanese 
bank could keep dollar reserves, or could convert them to U.S. Treasury debt—which is 
essentially just interest-earning reserves. When all is said and done, the American holds a 
new auto, and she used her income, or sold an asset, or committed herself to payments on 
debt. As economists are fond of saying, there is no free lunch for the individual 
consumer—and a trade deficit can be associated with rising indebtedness of consumers. 
However, increased American purchases of domestically produced output have exactly 
the same result, as they are financed in exactly the same way: consumer debt can rise. 
And just as in the case of domestically-held debt, the consumer might default.  
 
By contrast, if the U.S. government chooses to import a Toyota, it truly can “get 
something for nothing”—issuing dollar reserves that eventually find their way to the   22
Bank of Japan. Is this due to “dollar hegemony”? Not really. Any sovereign State obtains 
“something for nothing” by imposing a tax liability and then issuing the currency used by 
those with tax liabilities to meet the obligation. The only difference here is that the U.S. 
government has obtained output produced outside the U.S., by those who are not subject 
to its sovereign power—in other words, by those not subject to U.S. taxes. However, 
even within any nation there can be individuals who avoid and evade taxes imposed by 
the sovereign power, but who are still willing to offer their output to obtain the 
sovereign’s currency. Why? Because those who are not able to avoid and evade taxes 
need the currency, hence, are willing to offer their own output to obtain the currency. The 
U.S. dollar has value outside the U.S. because U.S. taxpayers need the currency. By this I 
do not mean to imply that U.S. currency is only used to pay taxes, or that those who hold 
U.S. currency or reserve deposits at the Fed do so on the knowledge that U.S. taxpayers 
want high powered money to pay taxes. Analytically, however, it is the taxing power of 
the U.S. government that allows it to issue currency and reserves that are demanded 
domestically and abroad.  
 
Much of the external U.S. dollar liabilities are government bonds. A U.S. trade 
deficit allows external accumulation of reserves in foreign banks or foreign branches of 
U.S. banks. Any excess reserves are offered in the overnight and Eurodollar markets, 
lowering interest rates. As the fed funds rate begins to fall below the Fed’s target, bond 
sales are triggered—by the Fed—that together with new issues by the Treasury soak up 
the excess reserves. At the same time, the U.S. budget deficit provides a continuing flow 
of reserves both domestically and, through the vehicle of the U.S. current account deficit, 
externally. It is this budget deficit which, ultimately, is responsible for the excess reserves 
that pressure overnight rates. The current U.S. private sector deficit plus government 
deficit together comprise the “twin” to the foreign sector deficit, with the budget deficit 
creating the HPM plus interest-paying debt the nongovernment sector wants to 
accumulate—both domestically and externally. 
   23
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is perfectly reasonable to apply Minsky’s classifications to indebted units in the private 
sector, although there is little reason to distinguish between domestic and foreign 
creditors when doing so. As we know, the U.S. private sector taken as a whole has been 
spending more than its income on a very large scale, with almost no let-up since 1997. 
This has accelerated the growth of private sector debt relative to income. (See Figure 3.) 
Over this period, it is likely that many individual units have moved from hedge to 
speculative positions, and even to Ponzi positions. However, the aggregate data relating 
total debt to personal disposable income really sheds little light on this. If every private 
unit (individual firms and households) had the same ratio as the aggregate ratio—
approximately 150%--it is conceivable that all could service their debt at current (and still 
relatively low) interest rates. (For example, at an average interest rate of 6%, debt service 
on current private sector debt would equal 9% of personal disposable income—6% of 
150% = 9%--a not intolerable burden.) Indeed, while debt service ratios have risen, the 
rise is not that dramatic. In the past few years, the business sector’s income growth has 
been more rapid than growth of debt. Households have been in the opposite situation, but 
it is not likely that many are in truly speculative positions. Rather, the greater danger is 
simply that they will cut back other types of spending in order to service debt (and higher 
energy costs)—which could lead to recession. 
 
It is likely that Minsky could make a quite strong case that the U.S. economy’s 
fragility has increased since the late 1990s, given fairly slow growth of income and 
employment and more rapid growth of debt. Creditors holding the debt of U.S. 
households and firms face the prospects that some individual debtors will not be able to 
service their debts. It is conceivable that foreign creditors face more risk than do 
domestic creditors (although the current interest rate differential does not reflect that). 
For example, the Fed and Congress might be less willing to step in to preserve asset 
values for external creditors. It is also possible that exchange rate movements could more 
significantly affect foreign creditors, if their claims are on debtors that would be hurt by 
dollar devaluation, for example. However, in spite of such possible differences of 
interests and impacts, it does not seem necessary to create a special classification system   24
to be applied to the portion of U.S. private sector debts held by foreigners. Nor, for the 
reasons discussed, does it seem appropriate to label a whole nation a “speculator” or 
“Ponzi” economy merely because some of the debt is held externally. To repeat: the U.S. 
private sector is probably more financially fragile that it was a decade ago, and many 
units are speculative and Ponzi, but that would be just as true even if all debt were held 
domestically. Indeed, it is possible that the U.S. economy would be more fragile if all the 
debt were internally held—since cascading defaults would wipe out domestic wealth. 
When U.S. debtors default on external debt, foreigners bear the direct burden—although 
secondary affects would come back to the U.S., for example, if that led to a world-wide 
financial crisis. 
 
This is not to deny that continued (and perhaps growing) U.S. trade deficits might 
lead to dollar devaluation. Given that U.S. debts are almost all denominated in dollars, 
devaluation would not be likely to have large direct consequences on ability of U.S. 
households and firms to service debt. (And, as noted above, devaluation leads to capital 
gains in the U.S.) Assuming—as is likely—that devaluation has little impact on U.S. 
imports, to the extent that import prices rise there could be some financial pressure on 
U.S. debtor households and firms. There could be other knock-on effects of a 
devaluation, but these are not likely to be so significant that we would have to revise our 
analysis. While individual households and firms might have to default on debt, and while 
this could generate additional pressures on the dollar, the central bank and treasury would 
be able to step-in to prevent any snowballing debt deflation process. 
 
On the other hand, if the U.S. debts were denominated in other currencies (say, if 
the U.S. were a Mexico), the effects of a devaluation on U.S. fragility would be very 
much larger. The dollar income of US resident households and firms could not be used 
directly to service the foreign currency debt. This is where we would return to Minsky’s 
four tier analysis. The relevant variables would not be the total debt to disposable income 
ratio, or even total debt service ratios. Rather, earnings from net exports, net flows of 
foreign direct investment, net income flows from assets, and net accumulation of short-
term assets would be the factors determining flows of foreign currencies to the U.S.,   25
hence, pressures on the dollar. The cost to households and firms of servicing foreign 
currency debts in this case rises directly as the dollar depreciates—as they give up more 
of their dollar income to obtain foreign currency (or go into debt to borrow dollars). 
Depreciation could in that case push them into speculative or Ponzi positions.   
 
While I think it is still a bit misleading to apply Minsky’s classifications to the 
nation that issues foreign currency liabilities merely because, for example, its tier one 
plus tier two net flows are negative and some households and firms are defaulting, it is 
easy to see why it is tempting to do so. Defaults could generate further devaluation, 
leading to more defaults. The ability of the central bank and treasury to intervene would 
be limited given that their holdings of foreign currency are limited. Some nations faced 
with such a situation “nationalize” the foreign currency denominated private debt as an 
alternative to watching their firms (and households) default. However, unlike the case of 
domestic currency debt, converting private foreign currency debt to government debt 
cannot eliminate default risk. Ultimately, this policy will fail unless the government can 
increase the flow of dollars (using one or more of the tiers), or can rely on official 
international institutions. For this reason, the usual Minsky classifications can be helpful 
in analyzing cases in which countries have external debts denominated in foreign 
currency such as the highly indebted developing nations that Minsky analyzed. At the 
same time, his proposal that the U.S. Treasury should issue foreign currency debt seems 
to be a particularly bad idea, that would put the U.S. toward a Mexico-type position. 
 
Turning to the real world U.S. federal government, which is the source for a huge 
portion of the dollar assets accumulated by foreigners, it is easy to dismiss the claim that 
its financial position could become speculative or Ponzi. The federal government services 
its debt by crediting bank accounts. It does not face the same constraints faced by the 
private sector, indeed, it does not really have anything approaching an “income.” It is true 
that the government records tax revenue—it “accounts” for it—but it does not and cannot 
“spend” tax receipts. Whether it is spending to finance domestic purchases (of goods, 
services, or labor), to finance foreign purchases, or to pay interest on debt, it spends by 
crediting dollars to bank accounts. There is no limit to its ability to do so. If its actions set   26
off a devaluation, it can still service its dollar debts. Whether we speak of the U.S. federal 
government’s domestically-held or foreign-held debt, it is not appropriate to apply 
Minsky’s classification system. Note that the government would be in a much different 
position if its debt were in foreign currencies, or if it promised to exchange its dollar 
liabilities for foreign currencies (or gold) at a fixed exchange rate. In those situations, it 
could be forced to default on its commitments. 
 
Given today’s current account realities, Minsky’s call for a budget that can 
balance at high employment must be modified. To allow the private sector to strengthen 
its balances, the budget should be biased to run deficits somewhat larger than the trade 
deficit at full employment. This would move us toward a synthesis of his early 1960s 
writings on the fiscal balance and his later writings on the U.S. as “world’s banker.” With 
a chronic and growing current account deficit, the domestic private sector cannot achieve 
a surplus without a very large fiscal deficit. Continued private sector deficits increase 
financial fragility and would—it seems—lead to an eventual “Minsky crisis.” Even if 
crisis is not on the horizon, returning private balances to a historically more normal 
surplus would mean a huge reduction of aggregate demand that is not likely to be fully 
compensated by a turn-around of the current account deficit. Only a large increase of 
federal deficits could allow the private sector to return to a “normal” surplus position. 
 
It is likely that the trade imbalance is “unsustainable”—but not for the reasons 
usually cited (U.S. solvency). Rather, as U.S. consumers continue to run-up deficits and 
accumulate debt, they will probably eventually cut back spending. This will reduce 
imports, albeit by an unknown amount. Similarly, the U.S. budget deficit is also in some 
sense “unsustainable”, but again not for the usual reasons. The budget deficit will rise if 
the U.S. private sector reduces its net spending; it will fall if the pace of private spending 
increases. U.S. spending by households and firms, in turn, may well depend on solvency 
questions. However, it is misguided to speak of the U.S. federal government, or the 
nation as a whole, facing financial constraints in a regime of sovereign currency and 
floating exchange rates. 
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Note on Figures: The following figures were developed at The Levy Economics Institute 
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